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The field of Strategic Communications Professionals: A new research agenda for 
International Security 
 
Abstract 
Communication has long been accepted as integral to the conduct of international 
affairs. The role that discourses, ideas, norms and narratives play at the systemic level 
of world politics has been examined extensively. Scholarly interest has now turned to 
how international actors use political communication tools to create and counter 
threats, such as propaganda, hybrid warfare, fake news and election tampering, and it 
is often taken for granted that states are inferior to their challengers in these domains. 
To address this, ‘Strategic Communications’ has emerged as a mode of thought and 
practice promising to enhance state communication; encompassing long-established 
activities including public diplomacy, public relations, nation branding and information 
operations. In this developing field, private sector professionals are increasingly being 
called on to support and advise governments. Particular attention has been paid to the 
‘Big Data’ private companies may have access to, but there has been little IR research 
examining the experts seeking changes in how strategic communications is practised. 
Informed by elite interviews with communication professionals across the public-private 
space, this article sets out a research agenda to fill this gap, enhancing understanding of 
the expert relationships that shape international strategic communications.   
 2 
Keywords 
 
Strategic Communications, Field, International Security, Experts, Assemblages 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of a digitized, networked media ecology has made communication 
appear increasingly important to achieving outcomes in international politics. The 
incorporation of new platforms into the global media ecology is thought to have 
provided state, non-state and private actors with an extended capacity to wield strategic 
influence through communicative means.1 ‘Big Data’ analytics promise more accurate 
readings of popular opinion and more targeted, personalized communication. 
Widespread citizen access to digital communication networks are thought to make it 
easier for insurgents to foster violent extremism among disaffected populations 
throughout the world. Threats arising from shifts in the global media space are 
encapsulated by contemporary buzzwords like post-truth, fake news and hybrid 
warfare.2 These changes in communications practices have significant implications for 
international security. 
                                                                
1 Nicholas Michelsen and Mervyn Frost, ‘Strategic communications in international relations: Practical 
traps and ethical puzzles’, Defence Strategic Communications 2 (2017), pp. 9-33. 
2 Damien van Puyelde, ‘Hybrid war – does it even exist?’, NATO Review, available at 
{https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-
ukraine/EN/} accessed 10 December 2017; John Corner, ‘Fake News, Post-Truth and Media–political 
Change’,  Media, Culture & Society 39:7 (2017), pp. 1100–1107. 
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The importance of communications practices for international security is typically 
articulated through two arguments. The first is that states are often inferior to state 
challengers in harnessing the contemporary communication environment. This is 
because they treat communication as secondary to policies and actions, whereas the 
messaging of insurgent or terrorist opponents starts with what they intend to 
communicate and designs actions from there.3 In counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, this is thought to explain Western failures to secure 
ongoing public support by not communicating the purpose of their missions coherently 
enough.4 The second argument is that liberal democracies are especially at risk of 
subversion by opponents using democratically-enshrined freedoms of expression to 
propagate disinformation, as shown by concerns about Russian hybrid warfare or the 
impact of fake news on electoral processes.5 It is debatable whether states are as 
disadvantaged in the communicative realm as is commonly assumed,6 but nonetheless, 
                                                                
3 David Betz and Vaughan Phillips, ‘Putting the strategy back into strategic communications’, Defence 
Strategic Communications 3 (2017), pp.41-69. 
4 Brett Boudreau, ‘We have met the enemy and he is us’: An analysis of NATO Strategic 
Communications: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 2003-2014 (Riga: 
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016); David Betz, ‘Searching for El Dorado: The 
Legendary Golden Narrative of the Afghanistan War’, in Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens 
Ringsmose (eds), Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the 
Afghan War (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 37-56. 
5 van Puyelde (2015). 
6 See Emma Briant, Propaganda and counter-terrorism: Strategies for global change (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2015); Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: Islamic State's Doctrine for 
 4 
widespread assumptions about states’ vulnerabilities in this arena have driven attempts 
to improve state communication practices.7  
 
In this context, ‘Strategic Communications’ has emerged as a mode of thought and 
practice promising to enhance state capabilities; encompassing long-established 
activities including public diplomacy, public relations, nation branding and information 
operations.8 Most research on improving strategic communications in IR has tended to 
focus on either communication content and form – such as strategic narratives and 
counter-narratives – or on better understanding of shifting media ecologies, networks, 
or the use of social media and bulk data.9 There is research examining the security 
communication of political elites, particularly within the securitisation literature.10 
There has, however, been little IR communications research specifically examining the 
experts who now seek to establish and develop strategic communication practices; in 
                                                                
Information Warfare (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 
2017). 
7 Neville Bolt, ‘Strategic Communications in Crisis’, The RUSI Journal 156:4, (2011), pp. 44-53. 
8 Kirk Hallahan, Derina Holtzhausen, Betteke van Ruler, Dejan Verčič, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, 
‘Defining Strategic Communication’, International Journal of Strategic Communication 1:1 (2007), p. 3. 
9 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and 
the New World Order (New York: Routledge, 2013); Babak Akhgar et al., Application of Big Data for 
National Security. A Practitioner’s Guide to Emerging Technologies (Amsterdam: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2015). 
10 For a recent approach examining how political elites reflect on how they communicate on security 
issues, see the ‘Security Communication in Democracies’ Project, available at 
{http://www.normativeorders.net/en/research/projects-2012-2017/66-forschung/forschungsprojekte-
2012-2017/1327-security-communication-in-democracies} accessed 3 May 2018. 
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particular, the proliferation of private sector communicators contracted on behalf of 
states to work on international affairs and security issues.11  
 
The increasing prominence of private Strategic Communications Professionals (SCPs) 
might be seen to reflect a broader diffusion of power from states to the private sector, 
described by Susan Strange as the ‘retreat of the state’.12 How influential these private 
actors are in international affairs is, however, an unresolved puzzle. The recent 
controversy surrounding Cambridge Analytica, subsidiary of Strategic Communications 
Laboratories, has resulted in significant concern about the ability of such groups to 
influence foreign elections through social media-driven micro-targeting.13 Widespread 
claims that such groups have the power to determine electoral outcomes have been 
met by counter-claims that their psychographic data was actually of limited use.14  
 
                                                                
11 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
13 Charles Kriel, ‘Fake News, Fake Wars, Fake Worlds’, Defence Strategic Communications 3 (2017), pp. 
171-190; ‘Cambridge Analytica: The Data Firm’s Global Influence’, BBC News, available at 
{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43476762} accessed 4 May 2018. 
14 Jonathan Allen and Jason Abbruzzese, ‘Cambridge Analytica's effectiveness called into question 
despite alleged Facebook data harvesting’, available at {https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
news/cambridge-analytica-s-effectiveness-called-question-despite-alleged-facebook-data-n858256} 
accessed 3 May 2018; ‘Reality Check: Was Facebook data’s value “literally nothing”?’, BBC News, 
available at {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43502366} accessed 3 May 2018. 
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There is little understanding of the scope of the strategic communications industry or 
the everyday practices of the experts within it, and thus little understanding of their 
international roles and influence. The global strategic communications industry is highly 
diverse, encompassing small, issue specific consultancies and large, diversified Public 
Relations and Marketing firms. Its experts fulfil multiple functions for governments, non-
state actors and businesses. However, the inherent secrecy of the industry has meant 
that few researchers have examined the nature of these actors’ roles, cultures and 
practices.15 Several related puzzles remain unaddressed: whether Strategic 
Communications Professionals are practising communication differently from more 
established communication fields; whether their cultures, practices and capabilities 
make them better placed to counter perceived new communication threats affecting 
global society; the complex power dynamics that shape their interactions with states, 
and what normative issues arise within their roles. In this article, we establish 
conceptual, analytical and methodological groundwork that would help address these 
questions through a new research agenda. 
 
                                                                
15 Sue Curry Jansen, Stealth Communications: The Spectacular Rise of Public Relations (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2016). 
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The lack of attention to Strategic Communications Professionals contrasts sharply with 
the international security industry, where extensive attention has been paid to the 
increasingly intricate ‘security assemblages’ of public-private actors that provide 
security today.16 These security assemblages are recognised as public and private, 
nationalist and market orientated,17 and characterised by multiple sites of contestation 
and ambivalence involving a variety of actors, rationalities and practices.18 We see 
considerable parallels in the international Strategic Communications industry, but there 
is a marked absence of IR communication research investigating these dynamics and 
how they influence communication practices. This paper breaks new ground in research 
on communications in IR by establishing a novel research agenda to investigate these 
complexities. The groundwork conducted here will make it possible to establish how far 
SCPs represent a coherent body of practice and expertise and potentially constitute a 
distinct set of global actors with autonomous impacts on international relations. 
 
                                                                
16 Rita Abrahamsen, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
17 Laurent Bonelli and Didier Bigo, ‘Mapping the European Union Field of the Professionals of Security: A 
Methodological Note on the Problematique’, Challenge: The Changing Landscape of European 
(In)security, WP 2 Deliverable, 2005, http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/iccm/library/63.html, 
accessed 11 July 2017. 
18 Joakim Berndtsson and Maria Stern, ‘Private Security and the Public–Private Divide: Contested Lines 
of Distinction and Modes of Governance in the Stockholm-Arlanda Security Assemblage’, International 
Political Sociology 5:4 (2011), pp. 422-423. 
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We begin by discussing what constitutes a Strategic Communications Professional, and 
what if anything differentiates strategic communications from other communication 
practices across the commercial, military and political spheres. We demonstrate how 
SCPs have emerged from within a blurred and contested public-private space in which 
state and private practitioners interact. We then draw on empirical evidence from semi-
structured, elite interviews with a range of SCPs based primarily in the UK, concerning 
their beliefs, practices and interrelationships.  
 
We find that SCPs see strategic communications as something new and unique, but 
disagree about how it should be conceptualised and practised. There is also significant 
divergence between state and private SCPs about where the weaknesses lie in the 
assemblages through which international strategic communications is undertaken, and 
whose organisational cultures and practices are best suited to leading international 
strategic communications efforts. Private sector SCPs criticise state strategic 
communications efforts as technologically backward, slow and inflexible; state SCPs 
criticise private sector contractors for repetitive and unoriginal tactical communication 
products. Their interrelationships are often far more complex than a simple contractor-
consultant relationship, and involve considerable contestation and struggle. In some 
circumstances, for example, private SCPs are employed by states to work for their allies, 
 9 
whose aims can sometimes directly oppose each other. They may even be working for 
both sides of an international conflict simultaneously, either at the behest of external 
governments or contracted directly by one of the parties.  Due to this contestation, we 
argue that rather than considering SCPs as a unified epistemic community, they are best 
conceptualised as a ‘field’,19 requiring both sociological mapping of its scope and scale 
and interpretive research into its culture and practices. We conclude by raising 
outstanding questions that would advance a new research agenda into the role of this 
field in international security practices and its potential impact on international 
relations. 
 
Strategic Communications and the public-private space   
 
The term ‘Strategic Communications’ is contested. At its broadest, Hallahan defines 
strategic communication[s] as ‘the purposeful use of communication by an organization 
to fulfil its mission’.20 This definition derives partly from the emergence of strategic 
communications in the corporate world where it was recognised that hitherto distinct, 
tactical and often overlapping communications activities such as public relations (PR), 
                                                                
19 Bonelli and Bigo (2005). 
20 Hallahan et al (2007), p. 3. 
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marketing and advertising could be coordinated to maximise effect.21 This unification 
also reflects the idea that strategic communications practitioners do not just operate at 
the tactical level, but have influence on the overall direction and management of 
organisations.22  
 
After the turn of the millennium, this notion translated to the military sphere. Initially it 
appeared as one of many influencing tools, alongside public diplomacy, psychological 
operations or deception operations, generating confusion over how it is best 
differentiated from them.23  Over time – and not without resistance – it evolved into an 
overarching concept under which multiple elements of national influence might be 
directed.24 British strategic communications doctrine has emphasised its overarching 
role in coordinating ‘words, images and actions’ in pursuit of national power, including 
                                                                
21 Rosa Brookes, ‘Confessions of a Strategic Communicator’, Foreign Policy (6 December 2012), available 
at {http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/06/confessions-of-a-strategic-communicator} accessed 30 June 
2017.  
22 Danny Moss and Gary Warnaby, ‘Communications Strategy? Strategy Communication? Integrating 
Different Perspectives’, Journal of Marketing Communications 4:3 (1998), pp. 131–40; Hallahan et al. 
(2007). 
23 Brookes (2012). 
24 Dennis Murphy, ‘The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)’, Center for Strategic Leadership Issue 
Paper, Vol. 2-08 (2008), U.S. Army War College, available at 
{https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/IP2-
08TheTroubleWithStrategicCommunication(s).pdf} accessed 12 July 2017. 
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‘public information, public affairs, information operations, defence diplomacy, soft 
power activities and diplomatic campaigning’.25  
 
Whether this idea of strategic communication is just propaganda by another name is 
debatable. Propaganda can be readily associated with ‘coordinating words, images and 
actions in pursuit of national power’. The two are more easily differentiated in the 
commercial sphere, since propaganda concerns political persuasion, which excludes 
most profit-seeking commercial communication.26 Differentiating the two in politics is 
harder, not least because their aims are essentially the same: to persuade people to 
think and act in a desired way.27 Strategic communication has undoubtedly served as a 
useful euphemism to avoid the negative connotations associated with propaganda, 
which is why propaganda is the term typically ascribed to opponents’ communications.28 
However, what matters here is that a community of professionals have emerged 
claiming that they are now practising strategic communications and that it is genuinely 
                                                                
25 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution, Joint Doctrine Note 1/12 
(2012), 1-2, available 
at {https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33710/20120126j
dn112_Strategic_CommsU.pdf} accessed 7 June 2017. 
26 Jacques Ellul, ‘Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes’ (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p.62. 
27 Philip Taylor, ‘Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present 
day’, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 6. 
28 Haroro Ingram, A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic 
Communications (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 2016), available at 
{https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-
2016-4.pdf}, accessed 10 May 2018. 
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different from communication activities that have gone before. How coherently these 
professionals conceptualise the term and how different their everyday practices are 
comprise the unexplored empirical questions this research seeks to address. 
 
A noticeable area strategic communications appears to be different from what has come 
before is the trend within public and private sector doctrine and practice to promote 
strategic communications not as a euphemism or a unifying concept, but as a mode of 
thought about communication; a distinctive mindset.29 The idea is that everything 
should be seen as a form of communication and therefore that everybody within an 
organisation should see themselves potentially as a strategic communicator. As 
Boudreau puts it in the context of NATO strategic communications in Afghanistan, 
organisations should recognise that ‘all actions, whether big or small, kinetic or 
otherwise, communicate something to somebody, somewhere: as does doing 
nothing’.30 This mindset reflects the assumption that rather than focusing on the 
messaging one is looking to project, strategic communicators in all contexts should begin 
by considering how all their actions, behaviours, words and deeds might be interpreted 
                                                                
29 Brookes (2012). 
30 Boudreau (2016), 41. 
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by target audiences.31 From this position, strategic communications does not just 
subsume and unify long-established communications subfields; it is a distinct mode of 
thought to which all members and actions of an organisation would ideally subscribe. 
 
These practitioners are of interest since they advocate a cultural shift in how strategic 
communications is thought about and practised. In other words, alongside a focus on 
how new sources of data can enhance strategic communications, there is evidence of 
an expert-driven push for cultural change in how organisations such as governments 
think about how they might communicate more effectively. Yet to what extent are these 
views shared amongst all practitioners who claim expertise in strategic 
communications? To what extent do SCPs represent a coherent group of experts 
crossing commercial, military and political domains, with a culture and practices 
different from what had existed before? What happens when these ideas about 
strategic communications come up against existing state communications practices? 
 
Interaction between the state and the private sector in political communication is 
nothing new. Governments have a long history of calling on private sector 
                                                                
31 Brookes (2012); Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011). 
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communications expertise, going back to the first recognised PR practitioners such as 
Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays a century ago.32 However, rarely have these relationships 
been studied in sociological depth and not in the context of Strategic Communications 
as a distinct mode of thought and practice. The consultancy literature addresses to some 
extent the relationship between private communications consultants and public sector 
clients, but as Röttger and Preusse observe, the ‘sociology of consulting is only in its 
infancy’.33 Existing research focuses overwhelmingly on the clients that consultants 
work for whilst neglecting the agency of the consultants themselves. Communications 
research has compared the differing challenges public and corporate sector actors face. 
The public sector is seen to face greater legal, political and timing constraints, and a 
greater sense of budgetary inadequacy compared to corporate communicators.34 
However, the nuanced and potentially complex interactions between state and private 
SCPs at tactical and strategic levels in the international system has seen little attention. 
As we will go on to demonstrate, with private practitioners sometimes contracted by 
states to direct communication strategy for other states, potentially subcontracting 
                                                                
32 Jansen (2016). 
33 Ulrike Röttger and Joachim Preusse, ‘External Consulting in Strategic Communication: Functions and 
Roles Within Systems Theory’, International Journal of Strategic Communication 7:2 (2013), p.100. 
34 For insightful examples see Brook Fisher Liu, Suzanne Horsley and Abbey Blake Levenshus, 
‘Government and Corporate Communication Practices: Do the Differences Matter?’ Journal of Applied 
Communication Research 38:2 (2010), pp. 189–213; Dave Gelders, Geert Bouckaert and Betteke van 
Ruler, ‘Communication Management in the Public Sector: Consequences for Public Communication 
about Policy Intentions’, Government Information Quarterly 24:2 (2007), pp. 326–37. 
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other private companies at the tactical level, a simplistic public-private divide is 
insufficient to characterise the operations of SCPs in international politics. 
 
The lack of attention to the complex public-private relationships in strategic 
communications is contrasted with the security field, where it has been recognised that 
security is increasingly provided by a combination of state forces and private security 
companies in ever more complex ‘security assemblages’.35 The complexity of these 
assemblages renders the public-private divide an inadequate characterisation as there 
are public-public and private-private tensions too.36 There is also overlap between 
security assemblages and the field of strategic communications. As Leander argues, 
private security companies do not just provide physical security; they also possess 
considerable power to shape security discourses.37 By providing intelligence used to 
identify risks and threats, and potentially recommendations on how to mitigate these, 
they play a significant role in securitisation.38 Securitisation is a communicative process, 
so all security practitioners are potentially implicated in activities that could be defined 
                                                                
35 Abrahamsen (2010). 
36 Berndtsson and Stern (2011), pp. 422-423.  
37 Anna Leander, ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military 
Companies’, Millennium 33:3 (2005), pp. 803–25. 
38 Didier Bigo, ‘Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon.’ in Didier Bigo and Anastassia 
Tsoukala, eds., Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11 (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 10-48; Leander (2005). 
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as strategic communication. As Burt notes, an increasing number of security companies 
offer ‘strategic communication’ services in the form of risk and crisis management 
advice.39 Such groups can be considered to be within the field of Strategic 
Communications Professionals, although for our purposes this depends on whether 
their expertise claims are communication-specific. Our interest specifically concerns the 
assemblages of public-private expertise seeking to influence discourses and practices 
concerning what constitutes effective strategic communications within security more 
generally.  
 
The other reason for the lack of research into the role of SCPs working for governments 
is the secrecy through which these operations take place. Success in the field is 
associated with invisibility, because persuasion is typically effective only when it appears 
unconstructed, authentic and the persuader’s intent is hidden.40 Because of this, 
research has tended to be limited to case studies of scandals, high profile failures, or 
when putatively propagandistic activities have been uncovered that are perceived to 
exceed acceptable state behaviour, or violate global civil society norms. The Cambridge 
Analytica scandal is the latest of series of political controversies concerning the actions 
                                                                
39 Tim Burt, Dark Art: The Changing Face of Public Relations (London: Elliott and Thompson, 2012). 
40 Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York: Ig Publishing, 1928); Jansen (2016). 
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of private communication firms. Others include the role of Hill Knowlton in creating 
what today might be described as ‘fake news’ in order to strengthen the case for military 
action against Iraq in the Gulf War.41 Another is the Shared Values Initiative; a campaign 
of television adverts to improve international Muslim opinion regarding the US during 
the War on Terror, that was criticised for being crudely propagandistic and ineffective 
as a consequence.42 A more recent example is Bell Pottinger’s work for Oakbay in South 
Africa raising awareness on ‘economic apartheid’, resulting in being sanctioned by the 
UK Public Relations and Communications Association for stoking racial tensions.43 A 
further controversy emerged in the UK when the Research, Information and 
Communications Unit (RICU) was found to be contracting private actors to conduct 
counter-radicalisation strategic communications, but without some of those companies’ 
staff knowing they were working for the government.44  
 
                                                                
41 Robert van Es, ‘From Impartial Advocates to Political Agents: Role Switching and Trustworthiness in 
Consultancy’, Journal of Business Ethics 39:1–2 (2002), pp. 145–51; James E. Grunig, ‘Public Relations 
and International Affairs: Effects, Ethics and Responsibility,’ Journal of International Affairs 47:1 (1993), 
pp. 137–162. 
42 Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick, Advertising’s War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State 
Department’s Shared Values Initiative (Spokane, Wash.: Marquette Books), 2006. 
43 ‘British PR firm Bell Pottinger apologizes for South Africa campaign’, The Guardian (10 July 2017), 
available at {https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/10/bell-pottinger-pr-firm-apologizes-
south-africa-campaign} accessed 4 September 2017. 
44 Ian Cobain et al., ‘Inside RICU, the shadowy propaganda unit inspired by the cold war’, The Guardian 
(2 May 2016), available at {https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/02/inside-ricu-the-
shadowy-propaganda-unit-inspired-by-the-cold-war} accessed 27 February 2018. 
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Such case studies are useful in highlighting that tensions exist when states contract 
private communication professionals to work on their behalf. That said, they tend to 
treat consultants as mouthpieces or proxies for governments, without investigating the 
tensions and struggles within these internal/external, public/private relationships. Such 
cases tell us little about campaigns that do not become visible as failures or as being 
overly propagandistic. They shed no light on the majority of international activities 
undertaken by SCPs, but they do raise a variety of important issues. These include how 
much control governments can and should exert over SCPs, who bears primary 
responsibility for the consequences of their campaigns, where power rests in their 
relationships, how this varies internationally, and practitioners’ perspectives on these 
issues.  
 
Each of these warrants further examination, in order to understand better the practices 
of groups of private professionals who work on behalf of governments to achieve 
communication outcomes. There is a limited body of research on these issues in the PR 
literature, with a small number of studies deploying elite interviews to investigate the 
cultures and practices of PR practitioners.45 However, despite researchers such as 
                                                                
45 See for example Dejan Vercic, Larissa A. Grunig and James E. Grunig, ‘Global and specific principles of 
public relations: Evidence from Slovenia, in Hugh M. Cuthbertson and Ni Chen (eds), International public 
relations: A comparative analysis (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996), pp. 31-65. 
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L’Etang advocating ethnographic and anthropological methods too, to our knowledge 
such approaches have not been applied to studying SCPs when they work as contractors 
in international relations.46   
 
Strategic Communications: practitioner perspectives 
 
To develop knowledge of SCPs and their roles in international relations, we conducted 
thirteen preliminary semi-structured elite interviews and a focus group with high-level 
professionals who practice Strategic Communications in the public-private space. 
Interviewees were selected to cover a range of roles and perspectives from within the 
public-private space of Strategic Communication Professionals. 11 of the 13 are either 
government employees who contract private companies (n=3) or private sector 
contractors themselves (n=8). Five of these are at CEO or Director level. Two are leading 
figures in UK industry associations, the Association of Professional Political Consultants 
(APPC) and the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA). These were 
selected due to their ability to provide an overview of the significance of emerging 
strategic communications practices in their professions. Most were based in London, 
which several interviewees claimed is widely recognised as a global leader in strategic 
                                                                
46 Jacquie L’Etang, ‘Public Relations, Culture and Anthropology—Towards an Ethnographic Research 
Agenda’, Journal of Public Relations Research 24: 2 (2012), pp. 165–83. 
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communications. The sample also included SCPs from the US, EU and NATO. Interview 
questions addressed how practitioners defined strategic communications, how they 
differentiate it from other communication sub-fields, the work they undertake for 
states, their views on how the public-private relationship could be improved, and how 
best to analyse their significance or impact on international relations.47 Levels of 
attribution and anonymity were agreed beforehand, with some interviews anonymised 
due to the secrecy of many communication campaigns. Interviews were transcribed in 
full and subjected to qualitative, interpretive analysis to identify shared themes for 
further analysis. 
 
Conceptualising Strategic Communications 
 
Firstly, despite the interviewees identifying as professional strategic communicators, 
participants defined it and differentiated it from other communication sub-fields in a 
variety of ways. ‘Everyone has their own definition’, as one participant put it, while 
another wondered whether ‘individuals that throw that word in don’t really understand 
what it means.’ There was also scepticism that many companies newly describe 
                                                                
47 Quotations were sometimes abridged due to spatial constraints, with false starts and fillers omitted to 
improve flow while remaining as faithful as possible to researcher’s interpretation of the original 
meaning of the text. 
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longstanding communication practices as ‘strategic’ because ‘it sounds grander’ or 
‘because it is the word of the moment’. This immediately indicates contestation not just 
over what constitutes strategic communication but also whose claims are legitimate 
when they are practising this supposedly novel and superior form of communication. 
Amidst this contestation, the most notable point of agreement was a clear belief in the 
idea that there is such a thing as communication that is genuinely ‘strategic’, and that 
this makes it superior to communication without this property. ‘Strategic’ in this context 
is not just a synonym for ‘better’ communication though; participants identified multiple 
characteristics that differentiate genuinely ‘strategic’ communication. 
 
For private and public actors currently working in or for governments, what made 
communication ‘strategic’ was aligning it more closely with policy. The Principal 
Consultant of a bespoke strategic communications firm, engaged regularly on 
government and military contracts, explained that he established his company out of 
recognition that ‘policy officials didn’t understand communications and 
communications people didn’t understand policy’, with his efforts aimed at merging 
understanding of the two. A communications manager in the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) with a private PR background confirmed a similar 
understanding. For both, strategic communications is ‘an influencing tool… to support 
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your policy objectives’, explaining further that ‘it’s impossible to do stratcoms if you 
don’t have a clear policy objective’. 
 
In addition to alignment with policy, other contributors suggested that it is an explicit 
focus on target audiences that can make communication ‘strategic'. As the Director of a 
private Strategic Communications company contracted to the UK government 
explained, 
 
Stratcoms to me is going to the audience first, understanding the audience, how 
do they receive information, how do they share information, how do they trust 
information, what do they really trust, and then creating a solution based on the 
audience not based on what we already have.  
 
This response is particularly revealing of multifarious ways strategic communications is 
used, in differentiating a ‘true’ form of strategic communications which is target 
audience driven from companies who just market their traditional work that way 
because it is currently in vogue. It also reflects a viewpoint held by several participants 
that strategic communications differs by being based more on honesty, engagement and 
dialogue than other methods. This can be debated, because the ultimate aim is still to 
persuade someone to think and act in the way you want them to; but it seems 
nonetheless reasonable to consider more democratic an attempt to engage with 
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audiences views rather than just project messaging at them. Again, this strongly 
reinforces our sense of a community of practitioners offering strategic communications 
as a different approach compared to modes of international communication such as 
advertising, PR and propaganda. 
 
As well as the target audience focus, another commonly cited difference was that 
strategic communications differs by being more long-term, as a current FCO strategic 
communication practitioner explained: 
 
I think too frequently stratcoms is seen as just another word for media relations, 
so there’s quite a lot of confusion between what a stratcoms team does and 
what a traditional press officer does. That comes up all the time, for example 
with journalists contacting us for a statement, and that’s not really it. Strategic 
communications for me is a lot more long term, it’s not about what’s going to 
appear tomorrow in the Guardian… it is about what are they going to be saying 
in six months’, nine months’ time. 
 
Taken together, these comments suggest that strategic communications is an activity of 
a higher order and ‘not just on the ground, tactical work’ as one SCP put it. That said, 
such tactical work should not be forgotten. A former FCO Director of Communication 
now privately contracted to advise other governments on international media relations, 
suggested that ‘you have to have a strategic objective of course’ but your 
communication is not really strategic ‘if you fall over at the first interview because all 
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you’re looking at is the long term and you haven’t thought through the immediate.’ This 
perspective emphasises that it is the overall integration and coordination of the tactical, 
operational and strategic that differentiates strategic communications as superior to 
activities undertaken before.48 In turn this implies a mindset whereby the potential 
communication effects of all words and actions would ideally be considered. 
 
The Different Roles of Strategic Communications Professionals 
 
If one sees strategic communications as coordinating different levels and types of 
communicative activity in pursuit of a given objective, then the field of strategic 
communications can logically encompass practitioners undertaking a variety of roles. 
This was borne out by our participants who, while claiming to practice strategic 
communications, undertake roles varying from oversight of national communication 
strategy to production of individual messages and products, the latter of which appears 
more tactical than strategic. In contributing to an overall objective, however, all of these 
roles are potentially strategic, but some are more strategic than others. 
 
                                                                
48 This aligns with the British government’s perspective on strategic communications. See Ministry of 
Defence, (2012). 
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Among those private actors that might be considered more strategic in terms of their 
overarching management role appear to be a small range of consultants providing high 
level guidance on overall government communication activities, in some cases directly 
for heads of state. Others operate at a range of levels, producing products, or working 
instead to improve governments’ abilities to undertake such tasks themselves. The CEO 
of a leading Strategic Communications consultancy summarises this well: 
 
It differs completely by agency. … It completely differs with every single client. 
We’ve got one client where our sole job is creating production, but for other 
clients it’s actually creating the strategy. Our job is to understand the audience 
and do the strategy. So there is always a tactical element to it but it depends. … 
There is no one fit. 
 
There was also notable national variation in the role private sector SCPs play, suggesting 
the need for sensitivity to this issue. British government communications managers 
describe how they would contract from a roster of approved private actors for 
operational and tactical communication products, but the government would provide 
precise briefs and overall strategic direction. Similarly, a Swedish government Strategic 
Communications analyst explained that his department only used private firms for 
‘monitoring tools, for advice, for surveys and specific tasks such as production and 
graphics.’ Other countries appear to see themselves as lacking expertise in strategic 
communications and therefore contract private companies from centres of expertise 
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such as London or Washington D.C to either develop their communication capabilities 
or direct their communication strategies. In certain cases, private sector consultants 
contracted by governments may be given the freedom to hire their own specialists to 
produce tactical products; giving them considerable power to direct the state’s 
communicative impact on international relations. As the Chairman of another leading 
consultancy explains: 
 
A significant amount of the value I add when I deal with a client is that I’m able 
to bring in the right people for the right jobs and invariably they’re people I’ve 
worked with in the past. … And that’s really, really important, it’s having the 
networks, it’s knowing the specialisms and capabilities. … So for example, if my 
client needs to be on Wikipedia in the right way, my Wikipedia guy is absolutely 
brilliant at understanding what Wikipedia expects of style, how the information 
is presented and so on. … It might be somebody that produces content, whether 
they’re a writer who used to write leaders for the Financial Times, or somebody 
who’s just brilliant at making ninety-second square-shaped films that are just 
great on Facebook. 
 
Public-public relationships between SCPs in different countries are also significant to the 
spread of strategic communications practices. As an FCO strategic communications 
manager explains: 
 
I am sometimes surprised about the lack of stratcoms knowledge across the 
international community. So the US does a lot of this, the UK does a lot of this, 
but even when you look at partners, you know say EU partners, it is very much 
something that they look to the UK for guidance and leadership and best 
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practice. And I think that’s really interesting that we’re at the start of 
internationalising stratcoms. … Every week there will be at least one 
international delegation coming in wanting to hear about stratcoms, not just 
what we do as a stratcoms team but other stratcoms teams across the UK 
government. It’s absolutely phenomenal. 
 
To complicate matters, one private sector consultant we interviewed was contracted by 
the British state to conduct strategic communications to enhance capacity in another 
state. This can create increasingly complex interrelationships where practitioners may 
be caught between the contracting government and the government they are seconded 
to. Alternatively they might be caught between different governments within a 
coalition:  
 
I was always aware in advising the foreign government in question that they 
can’t look at you and think ‘he’s just a Brit trying to get me to do what Brits want’, 
because that’s no use to anybody. Why would they want that? But on the other 
hand they know I am British and they know where my funding comes from 
because that would be dishonest if they didn’t. … I just tried to give advice which 
I really felt was good advice for them on their own terms. But it also was British 
policy. 
 
And from another case: 
 
We were doing a specific job for a government in a foreign country, which was 
demonstrably delivering peacekeeping results. The British and American policy 
was actually in contravention to that and pretty misinformed. When we went to 
the [British] government and knocked on the door and said ‘we have people on 
the ground, this is what is actually going on’, we just had the door closed in our 
face saying ‘we can’t even listen to what you’re saying because it isn’t the role 
of the private sector to meddle in these matters’. But we were actually hired by 
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the head of state in that country so it wasn’t meddling. So there can be those 
kind of conflicts which you then have to iron out. 
 
These brief accounts demonstrate the complexity of the relationships that characterise 
the roles of SCPs. Private sector actors can both act as intermediaries and proxies for 
and between governments; alternatively they might be undertaking tactical activities 
for one government to support the strategic goals of another. The accounts reveal 
multiple sites of contestation within these assemblages. Not only is there contestation 
over what constitutes strategic communications, practitioners are caught in struggles 
between actors who may have different goals. This potentially undermines their 
credibility with the actor they are contracted by or seconded to. The first account 
immediately above illustrates this, with an SCP contracted by the British government to 
an allied government trying to convince the latter that genuinely represent their 
interests, rather than whatever is British policy. SCP practices are also shaped by 
conflicting assumptions about appropriate roles and relationships between public and 
private communication actors and between states and non-state actors in international 
diplomacy. This is revealed in the second account, which indicates resistance from 
government to accepting private sector ‘meddling’ in certain issues even if they may be 
better resourced in a given context.  The ways SCPs attempt to resolve these issues and 
position themselves within these webs of networks and hierarchies is intriguing and, we 
argue, strongly justifies the need for deeper sociological research. 
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The Unrealised Power of Strategic Communications  
 
Despite conflicting accounts of the roles Strategic Communications Professionals play 
and how they define the concept, there were two particularly striking points of 
agreement across the range of experts interviewed: that strategic communications is an 
extremely powerful tool if used correctly, but that there is persistent failure to do this 
across all the other actors involved. This fed into differing perspectives on who is best 
placed out of the public and private sectors to be at the forefront of strategic 
communications efforts in international relations. 
 
For one CEO for a company with a broad portfolio of international activities, strategic 
communications is nothing less than a ‘very powerful weapons system’ that can 
determine which government is in power in a given country. Moreover, this power is 
‘only available in the private sector’ because governments are ‘constrained by so much 
red tape, an inability to mobilise fast, to be able to adapt techniques and technologies.’ 
In claiming this, the CEO is positioning private SCPs as the kingmakers of international 
relations, deciding who rules and who does not. Beyond this contentious claim, they also 
suggest that the unregulated nature of the strategic communications industry means 
that this communication power is available to whoever is willing to pay. Moreover, a 
general lack of regulation and oversight supposedly gives the private sector greater 
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flexibility compared to the extensive scrutiny government communicators face. The CEO 
reinforces this claim with an account of the commercial availability of hacking as a 
strategic communications tool:  
 
I was shown sales documents from one of our competitors that they go and show 
to clients to win business and it includes the provision of hacking. You can buy it 
as a private sector thing to anyone as long as you are willing to pay for it. There’s 
no legislation, or there may be legislation but it’s all done under the table, and 
that’s being offered by the private sector now as a normal function of stratcoms 
firms. … Where exactly does that sit? The idea is that there’s a big state out there 
called Russia doing it. It’s not the big state in Russia doing it, they will be using 
proxy companies from London who will do it on their behalf… You can go and 
hack anyone you want as long as you’re prepared to pay for it. 
 
This striking claims raises important questions about the cultural and practices of 
Strategic Communications Professionals if such practices are merely available to those 
who are ‘prepared to pay’. Whether the private sector actually possesses greater 
flexibility in using such means compared to the state ideally requires investigation. The 
utility of hacking as a tool of strategic communication also requires further research. 
However, the publication of hacked emails from the Democratic National Committee 
during the 2016 US presidential elections raises troubling questions about how this 
aspect of communication power is exercised that further justifies our research agenda.49 
 
                                                                
49 Nigel Inkster, ‘Information Warfare and the US Presidential Election’, Survival 58: 5 (2016), pp. 23–32. 
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Beyond determining who is in power, one private sector consultant with a government 
background suggested that effective strategic communications has the power to make 
policymaking more democratic, using dialogue to ‘break down boundaries that are 
forming between state, politicians and the public’. The key is recognising that stratcoms 
is ‘not a separate silo’ but an ‘inherent part of every single decision’ governments make. 
 
If people were empowered to recognise what they could do through stratcoms 
in government there’d be no stopping us. It would be incredible. But 
unfortunately at this point in time I do not believe the government could do it 
themselves and therefore it has to sit within the realm of the private sector.  
 
On the other hand, participants with experience of working in the public sector and 
evaluating the work of private contractors suggested that it is the work of private 
contractors that is often underwhelming. They envision a hierarchical relationship 
where the public sector directs private sector communication activities. According to 
government participants this reflects the situation in Britain, where the government 
provides strategic communications objectives and mostly employs private sector SCPs 
for discrete campaigns or tactical products. The aforementioned FCO communication 
manager suggested that the private sector are particularly useful in areas such as Target 
Audience Analysis where they may have stronger access or networks in certain theatres, 
or through possessing technical expertise the government lacks. Private actors may be 
better able to communicate with target audiences sceptical of government motives, 
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since their public engagement process would be at least one step removed from 
government. Improved access to audiences governments would otherwise find it hard 
to credibly reach might make their strategy and policy more informed.  
 
A further reason government participants suggested they should direct strategic 
communication activities was because they were often unimpressed by work private 
contractors produced. They criticised such work as ‘unoriginal’ or of ‘poor quality’, using 
‘naïve’ metrics such as ‘numbers of clicks [or] likes’ rather than delivering ‘actual, 
measurable effect’ in support of policy objectives. Finding credible measures of effect is 
a challenge throughout communications practice of course. Nevertheless, perceived 
failures of many private sector companies to demonstrate measurable effect appears to 
have engendered scepticism of their value to the British government at least, where the 
more common view participants expressed was that communication is best directed by 
those with a longstanding grasp of ‘how government works’. In turn, this has 
engendered questions about the power of strategic communications as a novel 
approach within the government. 
 
Such comments suggest considerable contestation over strategic communications 
capabilities, effects and oversight within the public-private space. One would expect 
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practitioners to present their contribution positively, particularly in a fiercely 
competitive commercial and political environment. Still, the extent of strategic 
communications’ actual power, and the actors best placed to optimised this, are 
contentious empirical and political issues that, we argue, require dedicated research. 
One key issue at stake is where the deciding power exists in the relationship between 
SCPs and governments. As our interviews have shown, answers to this conundrum 
depend partly on who one asks, and may also be context-dependent. Another factor is 
whether private and public actors share the same political goals, or whether their 
relationship is merely commercial or technical.  Each of these complexities calls for 
interrogation. The potential to identify and overcome barriers to more open and 
democratic communication between states and publics adds normative justification for 
research into these professionals. 
 
Towards mapping strategic communications as an international field of practice 
 
Before designing a research agenda to study Strategic Communication Professionals, it 
is important to define the object being studied. As we have indicated, SCPs exist within 
layered networks, both horizontal and hierarchical, the structure of which varies 
depending on the political project in which they are engaged. While this suggests social 
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network analysis might be a useful approach, we are interested not just in which experts 
are most influential but also how coherently strategic communications experts within 
these networks interpret what constitutes strategic communications in theory and 
practice. In the absence of research on SCPs in International Relations, reviewing the 
broader literature on expertise in IR highlights three frameworks that might be more 
useful in conceptualising them: as a community of practice, an epistemic community, or 
a field of practice. Determining which is most appropriate is an important empirical 
question because it has implications for which methods will be most appropriate to 
study the group in question, and for best addressing the puzzles that arose in our 
interviews. The more cohesive the group is, in terms of its cultures and beliefs, the easier 
its influences on international communication practices will be for researchers to 
identify.50  Given the power attributed to SCPs by some of our interviewees and recent 
discourses on issues such as electoral interference, providing a conceptual framework 
through which to analyse SCPs is a key step before any attempt to determine their 
effects in international politics.   
 
                                                                
50 Mai’a Davis Cross, ‘Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later’, Review of International 
Studies 39:1 (2013), pp. 137–60. 
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One way to conceptualise SCPs is as a community of practice. According to Adler, these 
are comprised of ‘like-minded groups of practitioners who are bound, both informally 
and contextually, by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.’51 
This notion captures usefully the idea of a group of experts who appear to share specific 
ideas about how communication should be structured and organised, and that this 
differs from other forms of communication that have gone before. The concept is also 
sufficiently flexible to account for the emergent nature of strategic communications 
expertise. Adler explains how communities of practice expand as they develop epistemic 
authority that leads non-members to adopt their practices and identities.52 This idea 
explains the spread of strategic communications in recent years from an unfamiliar 
concept to one used by a wide variety of communication professionals to describe their 
activities.53  
 
Alternatively, SCPs might be described as an epistemic community. These are classically 
defined by Haas as a ‘network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
                                                                
51 Emmanuel Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and 
NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation’ European Journal of International Relations 14:2 (2008), p. 195. 
52 Adler (2008), 202. 
53 European Communication Monitor Report 2017, available at {http://www.communicationmonitor.eu} 
accessed 10 December 2017. 
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knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.54 Like communities of practice they may 
come from a variety of disciplines or backgrounds, but the key theoretical difference is 
their greater coherence, in that they share principles, causal beliefs as well as a ‘set of 
common practices’ to influence policy decisions and resolve problems in their respective 
fields.55 In this respect, epistemic communities are thought to be ‘a major means by 
which knowledge translates into power’.56 This implies a methodology aimed at 
establishing the group’s policy agenda and the effects it has achieved in pursuing it. 
 
Despite the appeal of these concepts, the evidence we gathered from our interviews 
suggests that it is questionable whether there is sufficient homogeneity among SCP 
beliefs, policy orientations and practices to conceptualise them as an epistemic 
community or a community of practice; even if these may coalesce in future. Given the 
contestation in how they define and practice strategic communications, it appears more 
apt to consider SCPs a field of practice. Broader than a community of practice or an 
epistemic community, a field is potentially heterogeneous, fragmented and with 
amorphous, permeable borders, but nevertheless is identifiable as being structured to 
                                                                
54 Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 
International Organization 46:1 (1992), p. 3. 
55 Jerdén Björn, ‘Security Expertise and International Hierarchy: The Case of “The Asia-Pacific Epistemic 
Community”’, Review of International Studies 43:3 (2017), pp. 494–515. 
56 Cross, (2013). 
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some extent by structures of ‘common beliefs, practices and meanings’.57 In Bourdieu’s 
terms, a field is a social space in which social actors hold positions of power relative to 
others, with whom they compete for different kinds of capital, be it economic, political 
or symbolic.58  
 
This approach bears similarities to a body of research that has sought to map the 
complex field of security professionals as it has evolved in recent years.59 The emphasis 
on practice reflects the importance we perceive in not just mapping the varied 
perception of what constitutes strategic communications, but also identifying the 
diversity in what SCPs do, how they do it, and therefore how they influence wider 
practices in international and global society.60  
 
Conceptualising SCPs as a field is appropriate inasmuch as it avoids assuming 
homogeneity in either epistemic assumptions, policy agendas, or practices. It allows 
scholars to map the actors claiming expertise in strategic communications while also 
                                                                
57 Didier Bigo, Laurent Bonelli, Dario Chi and Christian Olsson, The Field of EU Internal Security Agencies 
(Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2008), p. 8. 
58 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1993). 
59 Bigo et al. (2008); Christian Bueger, ‘From Expert Communities to Epistemic Arrangements: Situating 
Expertise in International Relations’, in Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, eds., The 
Global Politics of Science and Technology - Vol. 1 Global Power Shift (Berlin: Springer, 2014), pp. 39–54. 
60 Michelsen and Frost (2017). 
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investigating multiple sites of coherence but also the contestation and struggle that our 
preliminary interviews highlighted. As Bigo et al. explain, such an approach facilitates 
the consideration of horizontal networks and also any hierarchical relationships within 
them.61 This focus on relationships within a field aligns with our analysis of strategic 
communicators as sharing contested but overlapping domains, with some producing 
tactical communication products while others exert operational or strategic oversight.  
 
With our data suggesting that SCPs are best conceptualised as a field, but one in which 
there is considerable variation in how strategic communications is conceptualised and 
practised, we advocate a multi-disciplinary research agenda that addresses these 
dimensions. This agenda would advance understanding of the role of SCPs in 
international affairs by combining research mapping the scope and scale of the field with 
interpretive research into its relationships, cultures and practices. This would begin with 
quantitative analysis of the global scale of public-private contracts relating to strategic 
communications, to identify whether contracting in this area is increasing, who works 
for which international actors, precisely what tasks they deliver, and how this is 
correlated to different types of contractor. Such data will identify which companies are 
leaders in international strategic communications contracting, and where they are 
                                                                
61 Bigo et al. (2008). 
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based. This macro-level quantitative map of the industry should be accompanied by 
micro-level qualitative mapping of the professionals themselves. Through interviews 
and focus groups, scholars can enquire into degrees of common background in, or 
movement between the private or public sectors, or between different public sectors 
such as military and civilian affairs. Further interview data will allow for mapping the 
relationships between the individuals that occupy this public-private field. These are 
likely to be defined by informal networks of trust.  
 
When considering the roles of SCPs in international affairs, it is not just a question of the 
quantity or scale of contracts in the space, but how they shape and are shaped by 
particular understandings of what constitutes effective strategic communications. 
Ethnographic research methods would be particularly useful in this regard, providing 
data on the shared common sense, cultures and practices of different sectors of the 
Strategic Communications industry. As L’Etang observes, there is a conspicuous lack of 
anthropological research into the communications industry.62 Our interviews revealed 
tensions between those seeing strategic communications as a tool to achieve political 
power and others seeing is as a means to inculcate more democratic practices. 
Ethnographic research into normative beliefs and cultures of SCPs would be illuminating 
                                                                
62 L’Etang (2012). 
 40 
in revealing how these underpin strategic communications practices in the field. 
Nevertheless, secrecy is likely to make participant observation difficult, especially with 
respect to ongoing government contracts. Elite interviews with practitioners seems 
likely to provide the most useful insights into participant beliefs and practices, although 
quantitative methods such as surveys or Q-methods might also be useful in mapping 
perceptions of strategic communications across the field. As has been shown in the 
intelligence studies literature, another highly secretive field, triangulation using mixed 
methods represents a pragmatic way to gain as rich and accurate understanding as 
possible when practices are intrinsically covert.63 
 
Some interviewees suggested that Britain, and specifically London, is one of a few global 
centres of expertise from which practices are spread internationally. This was suggested 
to be because UK-based firms’ principal industrial competitors, based in the US, are 
more oriented towards domestic rather than international markets. National case 
studies would allow scholars to identify how discrete communities of professionals are 
disseminating specific practices. Identifying national variations is of particular interest 
                                                                
63 Philip H. J. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in 
the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics 21:1 (2001), pp. 73–80.  
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given that private practitioners often work for multiple states simultaneously or are 
contracted by one government to work for another.  
 
Discussion 
 
Determining how SCPs influence the conduct of international affairs requires 
imaginative empirical and theoretical research. The contemporary media ecology has 
become immensely complex, impacting upon the ability of states and non-state actors 
in international relations to communicate in a measurable or targeted way. 
Understanding the effect of SCPs in achieving cultural shifts in how international 
communication is understood and practised is also challenging. Still, this paper’s 
preliminary findings suggest a number of potential avenues of influence of SCPs on 
international communication that warrant further scrutiny.  
 
Communications companies have long worked for states performing a variety of roles 
because they are believed to bring skills, knowledge and practical expertise that 
governments lack in the prevailing communications environment. This could be any 
government, whatever their objectives; the input of private expertise has the potential 
to make Russia better at hybrid war, the British government better at counter-
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extremism, or Luxembourg better at branding itself. Some governments may want to 
foster a strategic communications mindset across government; others may simply want 
to stay in power by any communicative means necessary. How effective SCPs are in 
helping achieve these objectives is an empirical question. Several of our interviewees 
noted that measuring the effectiveness of private sector strategic communications 
activities is extremely difficult, even if this has had little impact on the level of their 
employment. Nonetheless, in countries such as the UK, experiencing ongoing financial 
pressures, there is a strong incentive to demonstrate that assemblages of government 
and private sector SCPs are producing measurable influence and value for money. 
 
Amongst SCPs themselves our interviews revealed high confidence that their role in 
improving state or sub-state actors’ communicative capacities can be decisive in 
international affairs. IR theoretical research has frequently assumed that states are the 
most powerful communicative actors in international relations, even as non-state actors 
compete to establish and change international normative regimes. Contrary to this 
assumption, our participants raised decade-long concerns in the strategic studies and 
foreign policy literatures: that governments lack nimbleness, key skills, resources and 
high-tech expertise, and are therefore consistently out-manoeuvred by non-state actors 
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and insurgents.64 Whether this is true or not, these concerns influence state decision-
making around investment in their in-house international communications capacities, 
particularly if private SCPs can provide clear evidence of their effectiveness. The desire 
to secure business obviously incentivises the private sector to overstate their power to 
influence perceptions and deliver international outcomes. They are helped by a 
tendency to assume that strategic communicators have immense power even in the 
absence of proof of measures of effect, be they Big Data companies, subversive states 
or a combination of the two. This evidentiary challenge has been particularly striking in 
relationship to controversies concerning companies like Cambridge Analytica’s 
involvement in the US and European elections, or alleged Russian usage of bots to 
influence social media trends. However debatable such claims are, they must be taken 
seriously, not least because a wide spectrum of states may do so in their decisions to 
employ private firms, assuming they can best achieve political objectives on their behalf.  
 
Determining the effect of SCPs in achieving cultural shifts in how strategic 
communications is understood and practised across the international system may be 
difficult, but it is also important. Arguably SCPs are likely to be most influential if they 
bring into government a mindset not already there. Our interviews suggest that the 
                                                                
64 Bolt (2011). 
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private sector is most commonly contracted by governments in tactical functions, to 
produce specific communication products. In state agencies with a core 
communications role, like the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency which is ‘tasked with 
supporting cooperation and enabling communication coordination’, there is scope only 
for tactical roles. This limitation was also identified in the UK FCO, since it is considered 
difficult for an external party to come in and grasp the internal dynamics of any 
government agency. It suggests a potential tension between the desire of many SCPs to 
shift mindsets on strategic communications or to coordinate communication more 
closely, and the purely tactical roles they may be contracted to fulfil. SCPs can, however, 
be given more strategic roles, be it directing crisis communications, acting as 
intermediaries between governments, or representing the interests of one by 
substantively developing the communications capacity of another. When acting as 
delegated representatives of other governments they fulfil roles we might normally 
associate with state actors. Tracing the nature of these roles in concrete case studies 
would be useful. 
 
The degree to which SCPs affect significant changes to the communications practices of 
states remains unclear. Partly this is because the nature and variety of public-private 
contracts is opaque, even when not officially secret. Interviewees suggested that 
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strategic level advice from the private sector is not always well received, or deemed 
value for money. There may be important international effects that follow from the 
degree of mutual suspicion between public and private sector actors identified in some 
of our interviews, that cannot be straightforwardly equated to ‘better’ or ‘worse’ 
international communications. Both state and private sector SCPs expressed a belief 
that their collaboration could be made far more efficient, although they tended to see 
more fault in others within the assemblages by which they interact rather than in 
themselves. 
 
Variation in access to private SCPs is not evenly distributed at the global level, which 
may also affect who benefits from their activities. Local regulatory structures, 
perceptions of commercial risk, and the foreign policies of states in which SCPs work will 
shape access to private sector communications expertise. Perceived centres of 
expertise, like London in the UK, seem to exercise outsized influence on global 
communications practices. The relative lack of regulation of private sector strategic 
communications may create vulnerabilities for liberal democracies more constrained to 
act in certain ways than those seeking to undermine them, but who can access similar 
expertise. Russian ‘information warfare’ is a recurrent concern in this regard.65 On the 
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other hand, a leading UK communications industry figure suggested in interview that 
fallout from recent scandals is highly likely to increase political risk aversion amongst 
UK-based strategic communications companies in selecting foreign clients. Unevenness 
or changes in states’ access to SCPs may be pivotal to the distribution of ‘communication 
power’ across international relations.66 Having said that, the capacity of some non-state 
actors, such as online extremist groups, to influence and persuade audiences does not 
necessarily appear to be inhibited by lack of access to commercial expertise.67 
 
As international communicative tasks are contracted out to the private sector, to some 
extent commercial mindsets will inevitably also be imported. Private sector 
professionals, bringing with them distinctive cultures and norms, may alter which 
communications practices are deemed most effective and how they are implemented. 
It may be argued that SCPs are likely to uphold key international norms that foster global 
security and stability, associated with trust, reliability and credibility, since these are 
values which underpin all contract-making, whether commercially driven or not.68 But 
there are also potentially significant differences between commercial practices and the 
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logics underpinning stability in international affairs. One Ministry of Defence officer in a 
strategic communication role in the UK, suggested that contractual short-termism when 
dealing with the private sector made their work ill-suited to the ongoing maintenance 
of national identity narratives over extended periods of time. As they said, in the realm 
of international political communications, ‘Commercial does complication, National 
security is complex’. 
 
Private sector SCPs may bring with them cultures or norms of practice from specific 
national commercial contexts. If national bodies of SCPs share ‘common senses’ about 
the ethics of strategic communications, their globalisation may disseminate these 
values. This might benefit liberal capitalist states in the long term, as commercial 
opportunities abroad spread ‘western’ communications practices. Establishing more 
open and dialogue-based communications practices might have substantive 
international effects, associated with the maintenance what has been termed the liberal 
international order.69 Some industry leaders we interviewed emphasised openness, 
transparency and truthfulness as core values of what they considered good PR and SC 
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in the UK context, and advocated for these values in global terms, though they also 
noted this disposition was not universal amongst their peers.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that such companies’ commitments to engagement 
and dialogue may be just gloss, obscuring the fact that they are still ultimately trying to 
persuade people to think and act as they want them to. There are important, related, 
questions to be raised concerning the role of SCPs in relation to Big Data analytics, 
relating to the rise in populism world-wide, as well as how SCPs might either benefit or 
exacerbate the deficit in trust in democratic institutions. The research agenda we have 
outlined will provide a firm analytical and methodological foundations from which to 
assess the international significance of the field of Strategic Communication 
Professionals, which is implicated in some of the most pressing issues in international 
politics today.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Communications professionals play significant, yet often invisible, roles in international 
security affairs. Decades of research in international studies on communications 
concerning norms, discourses, narratives and ideas, have failed to examine this field of 
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expertise.70 The emergence of Strategic Communications as a term to capture what have 
in the past been understood as diverse activities provides opportunities for scholars to 
understand better the influence of communication experts on the conduct of 
international relations. As we have shown, Strategic Communications Professionals 
agree strongly on the power of strategic communications to achieve outcomes in world 
politics, but diverge on what it is, what it isn’t and how it should be practised. They 
operate in a complex space that defies the simplistic public-private divide, and is highly 
contested, reflecting the diverse nature of the communication and security fields from 
which it originated.  
 
The epistemic power of Strategic Communications Professionals is emergent, 
manifested in a series of competing visions, practices and understandings that shape 
how states think about and practice strategic communications. IR scholarship ought not 
to ignore this fluid situation, for how this global field of practice evolves can be expected 
to have significant impacts upon the norms and conduct of international politics. The 
global market of Strategic Communications Professionals may reinforce or increase 
scope to violate international norms, or it may otherwise transform norms around 
international communication in ways that deserve study. We have therefore set out a 
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multi-disciplinary research agenda to identify and map this field, to understand better 
its, scale, cultures and practices, and in doing so illuminate its roles in international 
affairs. At stake, we believe, is the degree to which Strategic Communications 
Professionals possess “the power to construct” international communications.71 
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